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Abstract
Loss or reduction of awareness is common in neuropsychiatric disorders and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena
but the underlying brain mechanisms are poorly understood. fMRI was combined with suggestions for automatic writing in
18 healthy highly hypnotically suggestible individuals in a within-subjects design to determine whether clinical alterations
in awareness of thought and movement can be experimentally modelled and studied independently of illness. Subjective
ratings of control, ownership, and awareness of thought and movement, and fMRI data were collected following suggestions
for thought insertion and alien control of writing movement, with and without loss of awareness. Subjective ratings con-
firmed that suggestions were effective. At the neural level, our main findings indicated that loss of awareness for both
thought and movement during automatic writing was associated with reduced activation in a predominantly left-sided pos-
terior cortical network including BA 7 (superior parietal lobule and precuneus), and posterior cingulate cortex, involved in
self-related processing and awareness of the body in space. Reduced activity in posterior parietal cortices may underlie spe-
cific clinical and cultural alterations in awareness of thought and movement. Clinically, these findings may assist develop-
ment of imaging assessments for loss of awareness of psychological origin, and interventions such as neurofeedback.
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Introduction
The everyday sense of being aware of our thoughts and move-
ments and exercising control over them can be altered or lost,
as occurs in a range of common neuropsychiatric disorders, e.g.
psychogenic non-epileptic seizures, defined as ‘episodes of
altered movement, sensation, or experiences resembling epilep-
tic seizures which have a psychological origin;’ (Lesser, 1996).
Awareness is partially or fully lost in up to 50% of these patients
(Brown et al., 2011). Alien control of thought or movement asso-
ciated with loss of awareness is also described in culturally
influenced dissociative phenomena associated with spirit
possession, mediumship and shamanism (Crapanzano and
Garrison, 1977; Rouget, 1985).
‘Automatic writing’ represents one cross-culturally promin-
ent form of altered experience and behaviour involving attribu-
tions of alien control frequently accompanied by loss of
awareness (Ellenberger, 1970; Shaw, 2011). The experience of
handwriting integrates both thought (thinking what to write)
and movement (the motor act of writing). Phenomenological ac-
counts indicate that during automatic writing, our sense of
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control, ownership and awareness of these two handwriting
components can be selectively altered. For example, historical
accounts describe how thoughts ‘surged . . . apparently from no-
where into the mind’ (thought insertion), or of how an ‘arm was
lifted into the air’ (alien control of movement) during automatic
writing (Koutstaal, 1992). Automatic writing can involve either
full or reduced awareness (Taves, 2006). Previously, we com-
bined suggestion and fMRI to investigate reduced awareness for
alien control of a simple joystick movement (Deeley et al., 2013).
Reduced awareness was associated with inactivity in parietal
cortex (BA 7, BA 40) and insula, providing a potential basis for
the attenuation of bodily and self-awareness reported in patho-
logical and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena
(Deeley et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the brain processes underpin-
ning both psychopathological and culturally influenced changes
in awareness of thought and complex movement remain poorly
understood.
We therefore combined fMRI and suggestions for automatic
writing in hypnotically suggestible individuals to create an ex-
perimental model whereby awareness, control and ownership
of thought and complex movement are altered. Our behavioural
study modeled experiences of thought insertion and alien con-
trol during automatic writing with and without awareness
(Walsh et al., 2014). The task design separated thought (thinking
of a sentence ending) from writing movement (writing the sen-
tence down). Previously we reported the neural correlates of
thought insertion and alien control of movement as separate
suggestions validating the automatic writing fMRI paradigm
(Walsh et al., 2015). Here, we focus on the neural correlates of
reduced awareness for thought and movement during our writ-
ing task. This allows us to model loss of awareness of involun-
tary mental content or movement as occurs in some forms of
culturally influenced dissociation such as mediumship, posses-
sion, or inspired writing, and dissociative psychopathology, e.g.
non-epileptic seizures. Based on our earlier study modelling
loss of awareness for simple joystick movement (Deeley et al.,
2013), we predicted that loss of awareness for both thought in-
sertion and alien control of complex movement (writing) would
involve reduced activity in networks including parietal cortex
(Brodmann Area BA 7, BA 40) and insula as regions mediating
the loss of bodily and self-awareness reported in pathological
and culturally influenced dissociative phenomena (Deeley et al.,
2013).
Materials and methods
Participants
Eighteen right-handed (Oldfield, 1971) highly hypnotically sug-
gestible (mean Harvard Group Scale; Shor et al. (1962); score ¼
9.7; SD ¼ 1.4) native English-speaking participants (13 female),
mean age 26.2 (SD¼ 8.3) years were recruited. All participants
were tested in a mock training scanner for compatibility prior to
participating in the fMRI study. This research was approved by
the Research Ethics Committee at King’s College London.
Procedure
Throughout each session, participants were provided with both
ear-plugs and headphones to protect their hearing from MRI
scanner noise (Hattori et al., 2007). Participants listened to in-
structions/suggestions via headphones and could communicate
with the control room via a microphone. Earlier studies have
demonstrated that hypnotic depth and response to suggestion
are not discernibly affected by the fMRI environment (Oakley
et al., 2007; Pyka et al., 2011; Walsh et al., 2015 ).
Prior to each experimental block (10 trials), the participant
received a set of instructions/suggestions via the headphones.
The number of trials was kept constant for each subject and in
each condition to ensure good model estimation of the neuroi-
maging data. The VOL condition involved voluntary self-
controlled writing while ‘hypnotised’ and in the absence of any
suggestion for altered subjective experience or behaviour.
Participants listened to the sentence stem and wrote down a
suitable ending when they heard the appropriate tone (see
Figure 1; Walsh et al., 2014, 2015). All three blocks were pre-
sented in random order after a hypnotic induction procedure.
Hypnotic induction and reversal
The hypnosis induction procedure was carried out with the par-
ticipant lying in the scanner and fixating their eyes on a white
crosshair target projected onto a black background. An experi-
menter administered suggestions (Supplementary Box S1).
Continued fixation on the target was accompanied by sugges-
tions of involuntary eye closure (“your eyes will begin to close
all by themselves”) which the participant was asked to confirm
with “yes” when this had happened (Deeley et al., 2012; Oakley
et al., 2007). The eye closure suggestions were combined with
suggestions of muscle relaxation, commencing with the face,
and then progressing systematically throughout the body to the
feet. Then, a counting procedure (1 to 20) was used to further
deepen the experience of relaxation, and the ability to carry out
all tasks they would be asked to do without it disturbing the
state they had achieved at the end of the count. Participants’
eyes remained closed throughout hypnosis. Ratings for subject-
ive ‘depth of hypnosis’ were taken (where ‘0’¼ ‘not at all hyp-
notized’ to ‘10’¼ ‘as hypnotized as I’ve ever been’) and the
experimental blocks were not commenced until participants re-
ported a depth of hypnosis rating of 7 or higher. All participants
had at least one prior experience of hypnosis (i.e. during partici-
pant screening for hypnotic suggestibility) on which to base
their response. At the end of the experiment and before exiting
the scanner, reversal of hypnosis was achieved by a reversed
counting procedure (20 to 1) and an eventual suggestion that
the participant’s eyes would open and that they would be wide
awake and fully alert at the end of the count. The participant
was asked to say ‘yes’ when this had happened.
For the experimental conditions, hypnotic suggestion was
used to model automatic writing by creating combined experi-
ences of alien control for thought and movement during a
sentence completion task (Table 1) both with and without
awareness, in order to model automatic writing (Janet and
Prince, 1907) and analogous dissociative and passivity phenom-
ena. During scanning, participants were presented with 10 sen-
tence stems in each experimental block and were instructed to
Fig. 1. Trial design. Each trial consisted of a thought and a movement interval.
Participants were presented with a sentence stem, which was repeated once, via
headphones. Two different tones marked the onset and offset of the movement
interval. The duration of the rest interval (approximately 8 seconds) was ran-
domly jittered by up to 500 ms on each trial.
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think of a short simple suitable ending to the sentence and
write it down upon hearing a tone. Each trial had an interval for
generation of a sentence ending (‘thought interval’) and an
interval for writing it down (‘movement interval’; see Walsh
et al., 2014, 2015). At the start of the thought interval, partici-
pants were presented with a sentence stem, which was re-
peated once, via headphones. A tone marked the start of the
movement interval while a separate tone signalled the end of
the trial. Each trial was succeeded by an 8 s rest interval (see
Figure 1). Trial interval durations were jittered by up to 500 ms
from trial to trial to facilitate characterisation of hemodynamic
responses. A video camera monitored the participants’ right
(writing) hand throughout.
The first automatic writing condition (TIþACM; ‘thought in-
sertion’ plus ‘alien control of movement’) combined suggestions
for TI and ACM within a single condition (Walsh et al., 2014). It
was suggested that an ‘engineer’ was ‘inserting the sentence
endings into your mind’ in the thought interval, and also
‘controlling your hand movements during writing’ in the move-
ment interval. The second condition was identical to the first
but also contained an additional suggestion for reduced aware-
ness for both thought and movement components of writing
(“The Engineer prevents you from being aware of the thoughts (s)he is
inserting into your mind. (S)he also prevents you from being aware of
any hand movements during writing”); (see Supplementary
Information and Table 1; TIþACMþ rA; ‘thought insertion’ plus
‘alien control of movement’ plus reduced awareness).
Participants verbally rated (‘0’–‘10’) their subjective experi-
ence for the thought and movement intervals of each condition
immediately following each scanning block with respect to: (i)
awareness (from ‘0’ ¼ ‘no awareness’ to ‘10’ ¼ ‘full awareness’)
(ii) control (from ‘0’ ¼ ‘no control’ to ‘10’ ¼ ‘full control’); and
(iii) ownership (from ‘0’ ¼ ‘no ownership’ to ‘10’ ¼ ‘full owner-
ship’). Additionally, ratings were taken for subjective ‘depth of
hypnosis,’ ‘0’–‘10’ (where 10 ¼ ‘ as hypnotized as I’ve ever been’).
The two ‘automatic writing’ conditions differed only in terms of
whether suggestions for awareness or reduced awareness were
given (see Table 1). Four additional conditions are reported else-
where (Walsh et al., 2014; Walsh et al., 2015). All conditions were
randomized and took place after a standard hypnotic induction
procedure comprising visual fixation and progressive relaxation
suggestions (see above; Oakley et al., 2007).
Image acquisition parameters
Imaging data were acquired at 3T using a GE Signa HDx MRI
scanner at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s College
London, UK. Functional MRI examinations were conducted
using gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (EPI) with the follow-
ing scanner parameters: repetition time ¼ 2000 ms; echo time
¼ 30 ms; RF flip angle¼ 80; Slice orientation¼near-axial,
aligned to the anterior-posterior commissure; number of
slices¼ 38, interleaved acquisition; slice thickness ¼ 3.3 mm;
slice gap¼ 0.3 mm; acquisition matrix size ¼ 64  64. For each
block, 150 functional images were acquired continuously.
Neuroimaging data analysis
Functional images were processed and analyzed in SPM8
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All images were initially re-
aligned to first image and then coregistered to their mean
image. The mean image was spatially normalized to the SPM8
EPI template with a 2  2  2 mm voxel size and spatially
smoothed (8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel), and high-pass fil-
tered (128 s). Standard assessment of movement parameters
and correction was conducted as part of the preprocessing of
the imaging data (using SPM8) and no excessive movement was
recorded. For the single subject first level analysis, the sentence
Table 1. Experimental conditions. The three experimental conditions and the focus of the suggestion/instruction for each condition. All condi-
tions took place after a standard hypnotic induction procedure comprising visual fixation and progressive relaxation suggestions (Oakley et al.,
2007). Scripts for the automatic writing conditions (Numbers 2 and 3) differed only in terms of whether the experience of awareness was
removed or not (see Supplementary Material for full scripts for automatic writing suggestions)
Condition Suggestion/Instruction
1. Voluntary (VOL)
(after induction of hypnosis)
“When you hear the sentence stem, your job is to quickly think of a short simple suitable end-
ing and then hold it in your mind and wait for the 1st tone. When you hear this tone,
write down the short simple ending to the sentence that you held in your mind. Once you
hear the 2nd tone – stop writing immediately.”
2. Automatic writing (TI þ ACM) “When you hear the sentence stem, you will have the experience that an Engineer has
composed and then inserted a short simple suitable ending to the sentence into your
mind. This happens immediately after the sentence stem, and before the 1st tone is
heard. . .When you hear the 1st tone, you will have the experience of the movements
of your right hand being initiated and controlled by an Engineer; these movements
cause the marker to write down the sentence ending which you kept in mind, each
time. Just hold the marker, the rest will happen by itself”.
3. Automatic writing with
reduced awareness
(TI þ ACM þ rA)
[Note: the suggestion for this condition was the same as for the “Automatic writing” (Nr.2) condi-
tion above, but with an additional suggestion to reduce awareness for both thought and move-
ment components of writing]: “As the Engineer controls both your thoughts and your
hand movements, (s)he also blocks your awareness. The Engineer prevents you from
being aware of the thoughts (s)he is inserting into your mind. (S)he also prevents you
from being aware of any hand movements during writing. The Engineer does not
want you to be aware of the end of the sentences or of anything that might be
written.”
Notes: The gender of the “Engineer” always matched that of the participant.
TIþACM ¼ ‘Thought insertion’ plus ‘alien control of movement’.
TIþACMþ rA ¼ ‘Thought insertion’ plus ‘alien control of movement plus reduced awareness’.
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cue onsets and durations, movement onsets and durations and
head motion parameters were entered as regressors. The group
ANOVA second level analysis included all experimental condi-
tions for all participants. All images were corrected for multiple
comparisons at the cluster level (P < 0.05) with voxel threshold
P < 0.001.
Results
Behavioural results
Depth of hypnosis. For the three conditions VOL, TIþACM and
TIþACMþ rA, the mean self-rated depths of hypnosis were 7.7
(SD ¼ 1.3), 7.8 (1.8) and 7.8 (1.3), respectively. There was no sig-
nificant difference in depth of hypnosis between the three con-
ditions; F(2, 34) ¼ 0.057; P ¼ 0.945, confirming that depth of
hypnosis was successfully established and then maintained
throughout. A 3 (conditions: VOL, TIþACM, TIþACMþ rA)  2
(cognitive component of writing: thought vs. movement) re-
peated measures ANOVA was performed on the subjective self-
ratings for awareness, control and ownership. There was a
main effect of condition, i.e. ratings for awareness, control and
ownership of thought and movement components of writing
differed significantly across conditions (all F > 34.0). There was
no main effect of cognitive component (all F < 2.1) nor did the
interactions reach significance (all F < 0.33).
Follow-up 2 (conditions: TIþACM, TIþACMþ rA)  2 (cogni-
tive component of writing: thought vs. movement) ANOVAs
were performed to investigate changes in subjective experience
during both automatic writing conditions. For the awareness
ratings there was a significant main effect of condition F(1, 17)
¼2 5.369; P < 0.0001; g2p ¼ 0.599. A modest but significant re-
duction (difference in awareness ratings between conditions ¼
1.4) in awareness ratings was observed between VOL and
TIþACM t(17) ¼ 3.160; P ¼ 0.006; Cohen’s d ¼ 0.873, (Figure 2,
left panel). This occurred in the absence of any suggestion for a
loss of awareness during this condition. Consequently, targeted
suggestions for loss of control of thought and movement also
reduce awareness ratings. However, a significantly greater re-
duction in awareness ratings (g2p ¼ 0.599) was observed follow-
ing the additional suggestion specifically targeted to reduce
awareness for both the thought (‘The Engineer prevents you
from being aware of the thoughts (s)he is inserting into your
mind’) and motor (‘The Engineer also prevents you from being
aware of any hand movements during writing’) components of
writing in the TIþACMþ rA condition (see Figure 2). The control
ratings showed a similar pattern with the main effect of condi-
tion reaching significance F(1, 17) ¼ 4.541; P ¼ 0.048; g2p ¼
0.211. Also note that there was an incidental reduction in con-
trol ratings associated with the combined automatic writing
conditions and in the absence of any specific suggestion for
additional reduction in control over writing (Figure 2, middle
panel). The main effect of condition for the ownership ratings
just failed to reach significance; F(1, 17) ¼ 3.747; P ¼ 0.070; g2p ¼
0.181 (Figure 2). The awareness, control and ownership ratings
data were also further examined with a separate mixed 3  2
ANOVA for each rating and with experimental condition (VOL,
TIþACM; and TIþACM rA) and trial interval (thought; move-
ment) as within subject factors and with order of condition as
between subject factor. No evidence of order effects was found
for any of the ratings for the 3 experimental conditions which
were randomized (all p> 0.281).
The number of words (Table 2) and characters written per
sentence-ending differed across experimental condition (Fs >
5.4). There was no significant difference between the number of
words or characters written between the VOL and TIþACM con-
ditions; t(17) ¼ 0.852; P ¼ 0.406; Cohen’s d¼ 0.284. However, dur-
ing suggestions for reduced awareness (TIþACMþrA), people
wrote less than in both the VOL and TIþACM conditions (all P’s
< 0.021). The effects of suggestion on the content of written
output (written word frequency, imageability and form of writ-
ing) are described in the Supplementary Materials. There was
no difference in onset latency between the two automatic writ-
ing conditions; t(15) ¼ 0.987; P ¼ 0.341; d ¼ 0.345. The duration
of writing across the three experimental conditions did not sig-
nificantly differ. Participants were asked immediately after the
experiment how well they could recall each block of the experi-
ment. Recall during suggestions of automatic writing with
reduced awareness (TIþACMþ rA) was significantly lower than
during voluntary writing; t(17) ¼ 2.600; P ¼ 0.019; d ¼ 0.867
(Supplementary Materials).
Behavioural correlates and functional anatomy of loss of
awareness
To identify brain regions associated with the experience of
reduced awareness during thought insertion and alien control
of movement, we compared activity in the ‘automatic writing’
(TIþACM) and ‘automatic writing with reduced awareness’
(TIþACMþ rA) conditions. During the thought interval condi-
tion, participants generally did not move as confirmed by video
recordings of their right hand (< 2% of trials excluded from the
analysis). Videos were inspected offline by a reviewer blind to
the experimental conditions using VideoPad Video Editor (NCH
software, VideoPad v2.22) and at a resolution of 10 ms. Videos
were reviewed frame by frame in order to pinpoint writing onset
and offset. Writing onset was defined as the unique frame
showing the initial segment of the first alphanumeric character
and writing offset was defined as the unique frame showing the
final segment of the final alphanumeric character written for
each sentence. A random selection (15%) of videos was reviewed
by a second independent reviewer (inter-rater correlation
Pearson’s r ¼ 0.84) confirming the validity of the review.
Effects of suggestion on onset latencies and duration of
written output
The video data from two participants were not available for
technical reasons. For the remaining participants onset latency
between the three conditions was significant; F(2,28) ¼ 4.261;
P¼ 0.037; g2p ¼ 0.233. Writing produced in TIþACM (mean ¼
1726; SD ¼ 523 ms) and TIþACMþ rA (mean ¼ 1817; SD ¼
652 ms) had a longer onset latency than voluntary writing
(mean ¼ 1458; SD ¼ 556 ms); t(15) ¼ 1.348; P ¼ 0.198; Cohen’s d
¼ 0.471 and t(15) ¼ 2.823; P ¼ 0.014; Cohen’s d ¼ 0.987, respect-
ively. There was no difference in onset latency between the two
automatic writing conditions; t(15) ¼ 0.987; P ¼ 0.341; Cohen’s d
¼ 0.345. The duration of writing for each of the three conditions
 voluntary (mean ¼ 6091; SD ¼ 1286), automatic writing
(mean ¼ 6217; SD ¼ 1488), and automatic writing with reduced
awareness (mean ¼ 5816; SD ¼ 1542) -did not differ; F(2,30) ¼
0.987; P ¼ 0.377; g2p ¼ 0.062.
During the thought interval, the suggestion for reduced
awareness was associated with a decrease in activity in left-
lateralized fronto-parietal networks. During the movement
interval, activity decreased in superior temporal gyrus bilat-
erally, left mid cingulum and right superior parietal lobule and
Heschl’s gyrus (see Table 3; Figure 3). There was no statistical
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difference in head movement between the different conditions.
However, it could be argued that minor differences in partici-
pants’ total head movement between the TIþACM condition
and the TIþACMþ rA condition when awareness was reduced,
might have contributed to the neuroimaging results. Therefore,
we repeated the analysis with the inclusion of a regressor
describing total head movement-related (translation and rota-
tion in 3D) effects in the design matrix of our General Linear
Model (GLM). Importantly, the neuroimaging findings were un-
changed (results not shown) with the inclusion of the regressor,
indicating that the observed changes in neural activity are not
attributable to head movement artefacts. We present an ‘over-
lap map’ of brain regions involved in both loss of awareness of
thought and movement in their respective contrasts (Figure 3).
Statistically significant overlapping areas were found in left
posterior cortices, marking these regions as critical nodes in
loss of awareness of involuntary thought and movement
(Table 4).
Larger cluster sizes can cross multiple anatomical bounda-
ries, making them difficult to interpret. Therefore to further ex-
plore larger clusters (Table 3), we repeated our main
neuroimaging analysis at a more stringent threshold (P ¼
0.0001). The main results were still present for both intervals. In
the thought interval, the left superior parietal peak and the left
superior temporal peak (Table 3) were still present, and a peak
emerged in the superior occipital gyrus (coordinates: 6, 14, 66).
In the movement interval, the superior temporal peak (Table 3;
coordinates: 34, 36, 14) fractionated into two smaller clusters
peaking in superior temporal cortex (coordinates: 60, 42, 18)
and in the mid-cingulum (coordinates: 6, 32, 50). A new mid-
temporal peak emerged (coordinates: 48, 68, 20). Therefore
tightening the cluster forming threshold did not change the sig-
nificant regions involved, but separated the clusters into more
discrete anatomical locales.
Imaging data for the contrasts between the automatic writ-
ing conditions (i.e. TIþACM and TIþACMþ rA) and the control
voluntary writing (VOL) condition are given in the
Supplementary Materials.
Discussion
Using fMRI and suggestions for automatic writing in highly hyp-
notically suggestible individuals, we created an experimental
model of conditions of altered awareness of thought and move-
ment. The main finding was that posterior parietal cortical re-
gions were identified as critical nodes in loss of awareness of
both involuntary thought and movement. Other areas were
more selectively involved in loss of awareness of thought and
movement separately.
Subjective effects of suggestions for automatic writing
At a phenomenological level, relative reductions in ratings of
control, ownership, and awareness of thought and movement
were in line with the suggestions (Table 1). This demonstrated
effective modelling of automatic writing with reduced or absent
awareness of the production of messages attributed to an exter-
nal agent, as well as dissociative psychopathology with reduced
awareness of involuntary mental content and movements. This
extends previous studies which have shown how suggestions in
hypnosis can model involuntary loss or production of move-
ment rather than loss of awareness of movement per se
Fig. 2. Mean (A) awareness, (B) control and (C) ownership ratings during the thought (white bars) and movement (black bars) intervals of a trial for the voluntary writing
(VOL), automatic writing (TIþACM) and automatic writing with reduced awareness (TIþACMþ rA) conditions. Standard deviations are shown as error bars.
Table 2. The mean number (N) of words and characters written per sentence ending, written frequency (CELEX-W; Baayen et al., 1995) and
imageability of written words for the three experimental conditions. Standard deviation of group mean is given in brackets
Condition N words N characters Frequency (Celex-W) Imageability
Voluntary writing (VOL) 2.8 (0.8) 11.7 (3.9) 7427 (3419) 308 (18)
Automatic writing (TI þ ACM) 2.9 (0.9) 11.8 (4.0) 8969 (4426) 318 (31)
Automatic writing with reduced awareness (TI þ ACM þ rA) 2.5 (0.8) 10.4 (4.0) 6270 (3636) 325 (23)
Overall mean (SD) 2.7 (0.8) 11.3 (4.0) 7555 (3827) 317 (24)
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Fig. 3. Brain regions showing lower activity following suggestions for reduced awareness during automatic writing (‘TIþACMþ rA’< ‘TIþACM’) for the thought (ma-
genta) and movement (green) intervals of a trial (see Figure 1). Areas of overlap are indicated by olive colour (see also Tables 3 and 4). No significant changes in activa-
tion were observed for the reverse contrast. Images are significant clusters overlaid on the single subject T1-weighted image provided with MRICron with slice number
relating to the MNI template shown above each slice. For the coronal (middle row) and axial (bottom row) views the left side of the brain is on the left.
Table 3. Brain regions showing lower activity following suggestions for reduced awareness for the thought and movement intervals during
automatic writing. No brain regions showed increased activation during automatic writing following suggestions for reduced awareness
(TIþACMþ rA)
Hemisphere Anatomical Region MNI coordinates BA Cluster size Z value Cluster-level p corrected
‘TI þ ACM þ rA’ < ‘TI þ ACM’ Thought interval
L Superior parietal 222, 268, 54 7 2828 5.42 0.000
L Precuneus 6, 258, 40 – 4.89
L Cuneus 210, 278, 40 19 4.39
L Superior Frontal 22, 34, 52 9 806 4.92 0.001
L SMA 26, 14, 66 6 4.17
L Mid-frontal 242, 28, 42 46 3.77
‘TI þ ACM þ rA’ < ‘TI þ ACM’ Movement interval
L Superior temporal 234, 236, 14 48 9258 5.21 0.000
L Mid-Cingulum 26,232, 50 4 5.15
R Superior parietal 20, 248, 56 2 4.86
R Superior temporal 48, 236, 16 41 1087 4.46 0.000
R Heschl’s Gyrus 34, 228, 14 48 4.37
Notes: Reverse contrasts: Thought interval TIþACMþ rA>TIþACM; all p>0.541; Movement interval ‘TIþACMþ rA’> ‘TIþACM’; all p>0.690. BA¼Brodmann Area.
Table 4. Brain regions showing the areas of overlap following suggestions for reduced awareness between the thought and movement intervals
(see Table 3) during automatic writing
Hemisphere Anatomical Region MNI coordinates BA Cluster size Z value Cluster-level p corrected
L Mid-occipital 228, 282, 32 19 1247 4.31 0.000
L Precuneus 214, 248, 58 5 4.29
L Superior parietal 218, 258, 54 5, 7 4.25
Note: BA ¼Brodmann area.
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(Blakemore, 2003; Ward et al., 2003; Haggard et al., 2004; Cojan
et al., 2009; Burgmer et al., 2013; Deeley et al., 2013 ).
Neural correlates of loss of awareness during
automatic writing
To identify brain regions involved in reduced awareness, we
examined the conjunction (Figure 3; Table 4) of changes in brain
activity during the thought and movement intervals. Compared
to automatic writing with awareness, reduced awareness dur-
ing both the thought and movement intervals of automatic
writing was associated with reduced activation in a predomin-
antly left-sided posterior cortical network including superior
parietal lobule, precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. This
is consistent with the established role of these regions in bodily
and spatial awareness (Northoff et al., 2006; Guterstam et al.,
2015). Regions in the superior parietal lobule (BA 7) and its med-
ial extension in the precuneus are involved in representing the
sense of body in space and body movements, and in conscious
awareness (Cavanna, 2007; Xie et al., 2011 ). Also, lateral poster-
ior parietal cortices (including BA 7) are involved in awareness
of intention to move (Desmurget et al., 2009). Previously we
demonstrated reduced left posterior parietal (BA 7) activation
during reduced awareness for involuntary simple hand move-
ments, suggesting a common role for posterior parietal regions
in mediating awareness of both simple and complex hand
movements, and thought (Hyv€arinen and Poranen, 1974; Kjaer
et al., 2002; Farrer et al., 2008; Deeley et al., 2013 ). Posterior cingu-
late cortex has been shown to be involved in processing self-
related stimuli in a variety of tasks (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Johnson et al., 2006; Guterstam et al., 2015 ).
Reduced awareness of thought and movement was also
associated with reduced activity in left angular gyrus, a region
with an established role in writing movement (Gerstmann,
1942; Rusconi et al., 2009). Our previous study of automatic writ-
ing with preserved awareness showed increased activity of left
angular gyrus during the movement interval but not during
thought insertion (Walsh et al., 2015; see also Supplementary
Material, Figure S1). The decreased activity of the angular gyrus
during reduced awareness of thought as well as writing in the
present study suggests a wider role for this brain region in
awareness. Understanding whether reduced activity of angular
gyrus during loss of awareness is specific to writing would re-
quire studies utilizing different, i.e. non-writing, tasks. To the
best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to demon-
strate brain regions involved in reduced awareness of thought
insertion, which are also involved in reduced awareness of in-
voluntary complex movements.
Neural correlates for loss of awareness during
thought insertion
The degree of suggested loss of awareness did not differ with
task component (thought; movement; Figure 2) but distinct neu-
ral changes accompanied loss of awareness for each compo-
nent. Non-overlapping regions of SMA showed reduced
activation in both the thought and movement intervals. This
may relate to the relatively greater reduction in self-rated con-
trol and ownership in the reduced awareness condition (Walsh
et al., 2014, 2015). In addition, other areas not previously associ-
ated with control and ownership showed decreased activation
during reduced awareness of thought insertion relative to
thought insertion with preserved awareness. Specifically, a left-
lateralized network including angular gyrus and superior frontal
gyrus showed reduced activation during the thought interval
with loss of awareness. This network includes areas commonly
associated with language (Price, 2010).
Neural correlates for loss of awareness during alien
control of writing movements
In addition to reduced activity in the posterior cortical regions,
reduced awareness for the motor act of writing was associated
with reduced activity in bilateral temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), in keeping with the established role of the TPJ in bodily
self-awareness (Blanke, 2012) . There was also a decrease in ac-
tivity of superior temporal gyrus bilaterally, left mid-cingulum,
right superior parietal lobule (BA 2), and Heschl’s gyrus (Table 3;
Figure 3). These regions are not associated with awareness
based on previous studies. Similar to the angular gyrus and su-
perior frontal gyrus during the thought interval, these regions
may be involved in reduced awareness in a process- or task-
specific manner. Superior temporal gyri are involved in auditory
processing (Howard et al., 2000). It is therefore possible that
reduced activity in these regions may reflect reduced response
to the auditory tone following suggestions for reduced aware-
ness. However, we consider this unlikely because a similar re-
duction in superior temporal gyri was not seen during the
thought interval, which included complex auditory stimuli.
Together these results suggest a role for posterior parietal
cortical regions in mediating reduced awareness, acting in con-
junction with additional changes in brain activity specific to the
type of cognition or behaviour for which awareness is lost (i.e.
thought and movement). Our findings cannot however reveal
whether the reduced activity in parietal regions is sufficient for
reduced awareness of thought and movement. While TMS of
the parietal lobe does indeed reduce awareness of hand move-
ments (MacDonald and Paus, 2003), it is not known how stimu-
lation might influence awareness of thoughts. Future studies
using TMS can test whether posterior parietal cortex is involved
in awareness of both thought and movement processes.
Modelling pathological and culturally influenced
experiences of alien control
The relevance of this experimental model to understanding
pathological and culturally influenced experiences involving
reduced awareness and control of thought and movement de-
pends on the presence of analogous features of the respective
cultural and clinical phenomena. In the case of culturally influ-
enced automatic writing such as occurs in inspired writing or
mediumship (Prince, 1929; Ellenberger, 1970; Shaw, 2011), impli-
cit suggestive processes based on social modelling and implicit
learning may produce similar changes in experience and brain
function to the present experiment (Walsh et al., 2014).
Similarly, narrowing or reduced awareness is reported to occur
in half of patients with non-epileptic seizures and occurs in dis-
sociative states such as fugue and dissociative identify disorder
(Brown et al., 2011). Some patients with dissociative symptoms
report reduced awareness in the absence of excessive move-
ment, potentially allowing measurement of brain activity with
fMRI to test the hypothesis that dissociative reductions in
awareness are associated with reduced posterior parietal cor-
tical activity.
In post experimental debriefing, participants reported sig-
nificantly reduced recollection of the experience of reduced
awareness of automatic writing compared to voluntary writing.
Reduced awareness may contribute to the amnesia reported for
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some cases of automatic writing and other culturally influenced
possession states (Crapanzano and Garrison, 1977) through
reduced encoding of information (Allen et al., 1999).
Alternatively, amnesia may result from inhibition of memory
retrieval (Markowitsch, 2003; Kopelman, 2010), as has been re-
ported in cases of dissociative and post-hypnotic amnesia (Bell
et al., 2011). Future studies of ‘suggested amnesia’ could inform
understanding of mechanisms of dissociative memory loss.
In conclusion, we have identified neural correlates for the
experience of loss of awareness of thought insertion and alien
control of movement. Our findings suggest the involvement of a
general network in loss of awareness for thought and move-
ment, including predominantly left-sided posterior cortical re-
gions involved in self-related processing and spatial bodily
awareness. Employing suggestion to model reduced awareness
for involuntary mental content or movement during automatic
writing therefore reveals mechanisms for functional loss of
awareness. From a cultural neuroscientific perspective, this pro-
vides insights into potential cognitive and brain processes
mediating reduced awareness in practices such as shamanism
and mediumship. Clinically, our findings may inform the devel-
opment of imaging assessments for conditions where there is
loss of awareness with unknown aetiology, and provide candi-
date targets for interventions such as neurofeedback.
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